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LACRIMAE RERUM: PREMODERN SOURCES 
FOR A THEORY OF NONHUMAN SENSIBILITY
In a famous ballad on the theme of ubi sunt (in a sense, “where has everything 
gone?”—the classic lament for the passing of time and the inevitable fading 
of life), fifteenth- century poet François Villon chose for his refrain the image 
of the snows of yesteryear. Snow’s transformative and impermanent miracle 
could be a Northern European version of cherry blossoms: “But where are 
yesteryear’s snows?” [“Mais où sont les neiges d’antan?”]. Lending snow, beau-
tiful and ephemeral, the same intensity as that which inhabits the names of 
vanished queens and beauties, Villon alchemically turns melted snow into 
lacrimae rerum, or “thingly tears,” making explicit the agency of things and 
the important role things play in the human realization, performance, and 
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reliving of existential, sweet, and inescapable sorrow, to the point that sorrow 
and things become one with each other.
 When Aeneas weeps at the depictions of the Trojan War in Carthage, 
he enjoins his companion Achates to rally and let his fears dissolve, since even 
this faraway nation will empathize with their plight: these, he says, “are thingly 
tears, and the mortal things touch the mind” (Virgil, Aeneid, 1.462: “sunt lacri-
mae rerum et mentem mortalia tangunt”).1 Since Virgil, the expression lacri-
mae rerum [“thingly tears”] has marked that sweet and sad entanglement of 
the mind and emotions with things— not necessarily warlike things, although 
the line is often quoted on military monuments. Virgil’s passage is famously 
multivalent, and its gnomic half- line is usually cited out of context. Symptom-
atically, one classicist explicating lacrimae rerum called upon Ezra Pound’s 
observation that truly great literature is “language charged with meaning to 
the utmost possible degree,” concluding that “the passage, of course, cannot be 
translated.”2 All agree that this famous line’s enigmatic nature lends it a “sense 
of wondrous beauty and pathetic dignity,” and “many would be disposed to 
quote [it] as the best verse in Latin poetry.”3 Here are some readings that have 
been given to the Latin verse over the years:
Tears for things, tears of things, tears that the things shed, things worthy of 
tears. Tears are powerful and their effects are material, so that tears can as 
well be called material things and considered real. The universe of material 
things sheds tears for us in the face of our acute misery. These images would 
wring tears out of stone. Sorrow and tears are implicit in men’s affairs or 
things. Nothing (or no thing) is free of tears. Depicted on the wall are events 
(things) that bring on tears; these are tear- inducing things. We all cry at the 
same things; great tragedies move us whether or not they happen to us and 
ours or to distant others.
The line’s fruitful multiplicity of meanings is exactly what inspires the later 
echoes.
 Lacrimae rerum— the classical, premodern, and modern precursor of our 
speculative materialisms, post/humanisms, and pasthumanisms— are not a 
narrowly premodern European concept. Take mono no aware [“the affective 
 1. David Wharton, “Sunt lacrimae rerum: An Exploration in Meaning,” Classical Journal 
103 (2008): 259–79.
 2. John Wright, “Lacrimae rerum and the Thankless Task,” Classical Journal 62.8 (1967): 
365–66 [365–67].
 3. Robert Yelverton Tyrrell, Latin Poetry: Lectures Delivered in 1893 on the Percy Turnbull 
Memorial Foundation in John Hopkins University (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1895), 147; par-
tially cited by Arthur L. Keith, “A Virgilian Line,” Classical Journal 17.7 (1922): 398 [398–402].
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and aesthetic force of things in the world”], a theoretical concept and practical 
precept that permeates Japanese culture of the Heian period (794–1185). The 
sensitivity, empathy, or enchantment to, of, and by things [mono] is used as 
a critical term describing the heightened awareness of the ephemeral nature 
[mojo] of  things, combined with a sense of wistfulness and an almost glad 
sorrow inspired by the consideration of transience evoked by objects, where 
understanding and feelings merge.4 Aware is the ability to be moved. Sorrow, 
pathos, or sadness are associated with aware (where aware = “alas!”), but pri-
marily the term refers to an intense impression (where aware = “sigh,” “Oh!”, 
and “Ah!”).5 The viewings of the moon and picnics of the cherry blossom sea-
son [hanami], a  tradition noted as early as the third century, are permeated 
with mono no aware, as  the cherry blooms [sakura] move like a fantastical, 
impermanent, earthbound cloud across the archipelago in a stately and inex-
orable wave. Since the rise of modern scholarship on Japanese literature, espe-
cially the contributions of Motoori Norinaga (1730–1801), examples of mono 
no aware are often drawn from the eleventh- century Tale of Genji, whose 
author, Lady Murasaki, often used the expression nominally, as when we say, 
“He has a certain je ne sais quoi.” It was also Norinaga who emphasized the 
Heian period commonplace that, when the awareness of things is particu-
larly intense, only sharing poetry or narratives that result from this feeling, 
and moving others as powerfully as one is moved, may bring relief.6 For us, 
the themes of mono no aware and lacrimae rerum participate in a premodern 
genealogy of the nonhuman as a work of art and the work or agency of the 
nonhuman in art, the topic of the essays assembled in this volume.
POST/HUMANISM AND THE CRISIS 
OF THE HUMAN/ITIES
The idea of enchantment with the world, and with its vibrant materialities, 
and with thingly tears guided us as we approached this collection, conceived 
 4. Tomiko Yoda, “Fractured Dialogues: Mono no aware and Poetic Communication in the 
Tale of Genji,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 59.2 (1999): 524 [523–57]. Yoda adds: “Mono 
no aware refers to a profound feeling with which one spontaneously responds to a myriad of 
things and occurrences in the world. To  ‘know mono no aware’ refers to one’s ability to have 
such a feeling for certain objects on an appropriate occasion” (526). See also Kazumitsu Kato, 
“Some Notes on Mono no Aware,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 82.4 (1962): 558–59, 
and Mark Meli, “‘Aware’ as a Critical Term in Japanese Poetics,” Japan Review 13 (2001): 67–91.
 5. Motoori Norinaga, The Poetics of Motoori Norinaga: A  Hermeneutical Journey, trans. 
Michael F. Marra (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2007), 174.
 6. Yoda, “Fractured Dialogues,” 527.
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as one possible answer to Judith Butler’s question, “What qualifies as a human, 
as a human subject, as human speech, as human desire?”7 and also to Edward 
Said’s provocation, in the context of the humanities, that
as scholars and teachers we believe we are right to call what we do “human-
istic” and what we teach “the humanities.” [Yet,] are these still serviceable 
phrases, and if so, in what way? How then may we view humanism as an 
activity in light of its past and probable future?8
For a long while now, there has been a significant turn both to and beyond the 
human (or, the liberal humanist subject) in aesthetic, historical, philosophical, 
sociological, and more scientific studies— a turn, moreover, which is also often 
accompanied by a nod to post- histoire, or the “end of history.” Thus, we might 
revise Butler’s question to something like, “What qualifies as a post/human and 
what is at stake in this qualification?” This poses a great challenge to those 
concerned with the future of humanistic letters and education, especially when, 
as  John Caputo writes, “one has lost one’s faith in grand récits,” and “being, 
presence, ouisa, the transcendental signified, History, Man— the list goes on— 
have all become dreams.” As Caputo writes, “We are in a fix, except that even 
to say ‘we’ is to get into a still deeper fix. We are in the fix that cannot say ‘we,’” 
and yet, “the obligation of me to you and both of us to others . . . is all around 
us, on every side, tugging at our sleeves, calling on us for a response.”9 Caputo 
expressed these sentiments (which are also worries) in 1993, but they accord well 
with the anxieties of the editors of the 2007 issue of The Hedgehog Review on 
“Human Dignity and Justice,” who were concerned that “transcendent accounts 
of why the lives of all persons should be valued” no longer “make sense,” and 
therefore, “one might ask whether a rhetoric of human dignity can be sustained 
and whether calls [in numerous human rights discourses] to honor the dignity 
of every individual can gain traction.” Is it possible any longer “to sustain justice 
without the idea of human dignity, or a similar concept?”10
 In relation to these concerns and anxious questions, multiple post/human 
(and nonhuman, inhuman, ahuman, and even post- posthuman) disciplines 
 7. Quoted in “Changing the Subject: Judith Butler’s Politics of Radical Resignification” 
(interview with G.  A.  Olson and L.  Worsham), in  The Judith Butler Reader,  ed. Sarah Salih 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 356 [325–56].
 8. Edward Said, Humanism and Democratic Criticism (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2004), 7.
 9. John D. Caputo, Against Ethics: Contributions to a Poetics of Obligation with Constant 
Reference to Deconstruction (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 6.
 10. “Introduction: Human Dignity and Justice,” Hedegehog Review 9.3 (2007): 5 [5–6].
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have (for a while now) been in full swing in the fields of the arts, human-
ities, social sciences, and sciences.11 In 2006, the National Humanities Center 
(NHC) announced a three- year project, “Autonomy, Singularity, Creativity: 
The Human and the Humanities,” which sought to “crystallize a conversation 
already begun” by “a small but growing number of philosophers, literary schol-
ars, and other humanistic thinkers” whose thought and studies have “turned 
to the work of computational scientists, primatologists, cognitive scientists, 
biologists, neuroscientists, and others” in an attempt to “gain a contempo-
rary understanding of human attributes that have traditionally been described 
in abstract, philosophical, or spiritual terms.”12 The NHC wanted to consider 
the possible ramifications of the approaching “posthuman era” by bringing 
into conversation with these humanists the scientists who have been turning 
their attention to questions typically reserved for the humanists— questions, 
moreover, that have to do with “the nature of human identity; the legitimate 
scope of agency in determining the circumstances or conditions of one’s life; 
 11. See, for example, most recently, Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman (Cambridge: Polity, 
2013); Claire Colebrook, Death of the Posthuman: Essays on Extinction, Vol. 1 (Ann Arbor, MI: 
Open Humanities Press/MPublishing, 2014); Noreen Giffney and Myra J. Hird, eds., Queering 
the Non/human (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2008); Richard Grusin,  ed., The Nonhuman Turn 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015); Patricia MacCormack,  ed., The Animal 
Catalyst: Toward a Human Theory (London: Bloomsbury, 2014); Cary Wolfe, What Is Post-
humanism? (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009); and Joanna Zylinska, Mini-
mal Ethics for the Anthropocene (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press/MPublishing, 2014). The 
recent turns to “new materialisms,” “speculative realism,” and “object- oriented” studies have 
given fresh impetus as well to the longer- standing post/human turn. See, for example, Stacy 
Alaimo, Bodily Natures: Science, Environment, and the Material Self (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2010); Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2010); Ian Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, or  What It’s Like to Be 
a Thing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012); Levi Bryant, The Democracy of 
Objects (Ann Arbor, MI: Open Humanities Press, 2011); Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Gra-
ham Harman,  eds., The  Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism (Melbourne: 
re.press, 2011); William E. Connolly, The Fragility of Things: Self- Organizing Processes, Neolib-
eral Fantasies, and Democratic Activism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013); Diana 
Coole and Samantha Frost,  eds., New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2010); Graham Harman, Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and 
Metaphysics (Melbourne: re.press, 2009) and The Quadruple Object (Hants, UK: Zero Books, 
2011); Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An  Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, trans. 
Ray Brassier (London: Bloomsbury, 2010); Timothy Morton, Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology, 
Causality (Ann Arbor, MI: Open Humanities Press/MPublishing, 2013) and Hyperobjects: Phi-
losophy and Ecology after the End of the World (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2013); Steven Shaviro, The Universe of Things: On Speculative Realism (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2014); and Tom Sparrow, The End of Phenomenology: Metaphysics and the 
New Realism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014).
 12. National Humanities Center, “Autonomy, Singularity, Creativity: A  Project of the 
National Humanities Center,” National Humanities Center, May 2007, http:// onthehuman .org 
/archive /more /.
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the relation of cognition to embodiment; the role of chance, luck, or fate; the 
definition of and value attached to ‘nature’; and the nature and limits of moral 
responsibility.”13 From 2006 through 2009, the NHC offered residential fellow-
ships and convened symposia and seminars that brought together humanists 
and scientists to engage in a more comprehensive dialogue on the following 
three “distinct but related areas”:
(1) Human autonomy, which entails the capacity for self- determination, 
self- awareness, and self- regulation that is central to our conceptions of 
free will and moral accountability;
(2) Human singularity, on which our privileged place in the order of being, 
distinct from animals on the one hand and from machines on the 
other, is premised;
(3) Human creativity, through which mankind demonstrates its capacity 
for representation and expression, and which many take to be the dis-
tinctive feature of the human species.14
These objectives make clear that the NHC focused its energies on three areas 
that are distinctly related to what might be called an ongoing “crisis” of the 
(supposed) stability and centrality of the liberal, sovereign human subject 
within the realm of so- called human affairs (having to do with morality, gov-
ernance, sovereignty, freedom, the arts, etc.), which are also traditionally held 
to underpin the mission and projects of the human/ities, and the university 
more largely.
 According to Katherine Hayles, who helped to usher in the post/human 
turn15 and who served as a Senior Fellow in NHC’s Project, “The humanities 
have always been concerned with shifting definitions of the human,” so “the 
human has always been a kind of contested term.” But for Hayles, “what the 
idea of the posthuman evokes that is not unique to the twentieth century, but 
became much more highly energized in the twentieth century, is the idea that 
technology has progressed to the point where it has the capability of funda-
mentally transforming the conditions of human life.”16 As Hayles elaborated:
 13. Ibid.
 14. Ibid.
 15. See  N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, 
Literature, and Informatics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999) and My Mother Was 
a Computer: Digital Subjects and Literary Texts (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 
among other works.
 16. Quoted in Don Solomon, “Interview with N. Katherine Hayles: Preparing the Human-
ities for the Post Human,” National Humanities Center, May 2007, http://onthe human .org 
/archive /more /interview -with -n -katherine -hayles /.
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Even though “one of the deep ideas of the humanities is that the past is an 
enduring reservoir of value, and that it pays us rich dividends to know the 
past,” there are some things “that have never happened before in human his-
tory. . . . We’ve never had the possibility for manipulating our own genome 
in a generation as opposed to 150 generations. We never had the possibility 
for individually manipulating atoms as in nanotechnology, and so forth.”17
The post/human condition, then, in some respects (and according to some), 
is thoroughly modern because of its dependence, partly, on technological and 
medical innovations that could not have even been imagined in the past. It has 
to be stated that in many post/humanist discourses that have been circulating 
within the university, whether in the humanities or the sciences, the schol-
arship of those who work in premodern periods (such as classical antiquity, 
late antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance) is often not considered 
relevant to the discussion— even when that scholarship is concerned, as some 
of it definitively has been, with issues of the human and the animal, self and 
subjectivity, cognition and theory of mind, singularity and networks, corpo-
rality and embodiment, bare life and sociality, flesh versus machine, and so 
on. In more recent years, this has been changing, however, with monographs, 
essay collections, and journal issues in premodern studies that play a promi-
nent and influential role in the post/human turn.18 Nevertheless, the question 
of historical difference remains something of a problematic.
 17. Ibid.
 18. See, for example, Jeffrey Jerome Cohen,  ed., Animal, Vegetable, Mineral: Ethics and 
Objects (Brooklyn, NY: punctum books, 2012); idem, Inhuman Nature (Brooklyn: punc-
tum books, 2014); Jeffrey Jerome Cohen and Lowell Duckert,  eds., “Ecomaterialism,” special 
issue, postmedieval: a  journal of medieval cultural studies 4.1 (2013); Jean  E. Feerick and Vin 
Nardizzi, eds., The Indistinct Human in Renaissance Literature (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012); Stefan Herbrechter and Ivan Callas, Posthumanist Shakespeares (New York: Palgrave Mac-
millan, 2012); Eileen A. Joy and Christine Neufeld, eds., “Premodern to Modern Humanisms: 
The BABEL Project,” special issue, Journal of Narrative Theory 37.2 (2007); Eileen A. Joy and 
Craig Dionne, eds., “When Did We Become Post/human?” special issue, postmedieval: a journal 
of medieval cultural studies 1 .1 /2 (2010); J. Allan Mitchell, Becoming Human: The Matter of the 
Medieval Child (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014); The Petropunk Collective 
[Eileen A. Joy, Anna Kłosowska, Nicola Masciandaro, and Michael O’Rourke], eds., Speculative 
Medievalisms: Discography (Brooklyn, NY: punctum books, 2013); Laurie Shannon, The Accom-
modated Animal: Cosmopolity in Shakespearean Locales (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2013); Karl Steel, How to Make a Human: Animals and Violence in the Middle Ages (Columbus: 
The Ohio State University Press, 2011); Karl Steel and Peggy McCracken,  eds., “The Animal 
Turn,” special issue, postmedieval: a  journal of medieval cultural studies 2.1 (2011); Henry  S. 
Turner, Shakespeare’s Double Helix (London: Bloomsbury, 2008); and Julian Yates, Error, Misuse, 
Failure: Object Lessons from the English Renaissance (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2002).
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 So, for example, in an early prospectus (circa 2007) for the Posthuman-
ities book series at the University of Minnesota, series director Cary Wolfe 
argued that post/humanism cannot be glossed with reference to terms like 
“post- industrialist” or “post- structuralist” or “post- modern,” for “the question 
of ‘posthumanism’ is more complicated than any of these [other ‘post- isms’], 
because it references not just chronological progression (what comes after the 
industrial, the modern, and so on) but also takes on fundamental ontologi-
cal and epistemological questions that are not reducible to purely historical 
explanation.” Indeed, it was Wolfe’s hope when inaugurating the series that the 
books would draw “renewed attention to the difference between historicity and 
‘historicism’ that seems to have been largely elided or avoided in much recent 
work in the humanities.”19 The series, then, is “not ‘against’ history, of course, 
but against historicism in its more unreflective and problematic forms.” The 
imprint has since published 33 books, none of which are exclusively focused 
on premodern subjects, although some of the books do tangentially touch 
upon those,20 and thus, regardless of its claims to reject the overly simplistic 
construct of “what comes after” and to aim for a more complex historiography, 
the series nevertheless remains somewhat stuck in the chrono- landscape of 
contemporary thought and life, and its “historicism” is not very deep. Its pro-
spectus also overlooks the fact that for quite a while now, in premodern stud-
ies, but also in cultural and historiographical studies, much work has actually 
been done to attend to the differences between historicity and historicism.21
 19. The prospectus for University of Minnesota’s Posthumanities book series, authored 
by Cary Wolfe, is  no longer available online, but was first accessed and transcribed by us in 
October 2007.
 20. Such as Tom Tyler, Ciferae: A Bestiary in Five Fingers (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, 2012).
 21. See footnote 28 for the relevant works in premodern studies, and in the field of cul-
tural studies and history, see (as  just a small sampling) F. R. Ankersmit, Historical Represen-
tation (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002); Roger Chartier, On the Edge of a Cliff: 
History, Language, Practices, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 
1996); Andreas Huyssens, Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2003) and Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia 
(New York: Routledge, 1995); Dominick LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001); Peter Osborne, The Politics of Time: Modernity and the 
Avant- Garde (London: Verso, 1995); Eric L. Santner, Stranded Objects: Mourning, Memory and 
Film in Postwar Germany (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Hayden White, 
The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1990). It should be noted as well that practically the entire oeuvre of 
the historians initially attached to the Annales, Histoire, Sciences Sociales journal (founded in 
1929)—such as Marc Bloch, Lucien Febvre, and Fernand Braudel, among others— also attended 
to the divide between historicity and historicism, although this is not always acknowledged in 
current work on chronicity and historiography.
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 Nevertheless, it is precisely to Wolfe’s hope of a theoretical post/humanism 
that would pay better attention to the difference between historicity and an 
unreflective historicism, and to Hayles’s assertion that certain aspects of the 
post/human can only ever be modern (or, driven by certain post- nineteenth- 
century technologies), that our volume of essays, Fragments For a History of 
a Vanishing Humanism, addresses itself. After all, Wolfe himself has argued 
that “the human is not now, and never was, itself,”22 and scholars in medi-
eval studies have explored the question of the relation between the post/
human (or  never- human) and the past— a  question that has been explored, 
for example, by Jeffrey Jerome Cohen in his book Medieval Identity Machines, 
where he writes that even in the Middle Ages human identity was, “despite 
the best efforts of those who possess[ed] it otherwise— unstable, contingent, 
hybrid, discontinuous.”23 In all times and places, as  Cohen has argued else-
where, being human really means “endlessly ‘becoming human.’ It means hold-
ing an uncertain identity, an identity that is always slipping away from us,”24 
and this resonates with Hayles’s idea that human subjectivity emerges from and 
is integrated “into a chaotic world rather than occupying a position of mastery 
and control removed from it.”25 More specifically, we want to continue filling 
in (and further complicating) what we believe has been a definitive lacuna or 
gap in post/humanist studies more generally: the absence of a theoretically 
rigorous longer (premodern) historical perspective. Many of the contempo-
rary discourses on post/humanism have mainly focused on the ways in which 
new findings and developments in fields such as biotechnology, neuroscience, 
and computing have complicated how we believe we are enacting our human 
“selves,” ushering in the language of crisis over the supposed destabilization 
of the category “human” in its biological, social, and political aspects (the 
futurist- dystopic view).26 Or, they have concentrated on a theoretical reform of 
 22. Cary Wolfe, “Introduction,” in  Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal,  ed. Wolfe 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), xiii [ix–xxiii].
 23. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, Medieval Identity Machines (Minneapolis: University of Minne-
sota Press, 2003), xxiii.
 24. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, “Afterword: An Unfinished Conversation about Glowing Green 
Bunnies,” in Queering the Non/human, eds. Giffney and Hird, 373–74 [363–75].
 25. Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, 291.
 26. For one of the best examples of the “crisis,” or  dystopic, perspective, see Francis 
Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (New York: 
Farar, Straus and Giroux, 2002). See also Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity (Cambridge: 
Blackwell, 2000); Benjamin Bratton, The Stack: On Software and Sovereignty (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2015); Kenneth Gergen, The Saturated Self: Dilemmas of Identity in Contemporary Life 
(New York: Basic Books, 1991); Benjamin Noys, Malign Velocities: Accelerationism and Capital-
ism (Hants, UK, 2014); Eugene Thacker and Alexander Galloway, The Exploit: A Theory of Net-
works (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007); Paul Virilio, The Information Bomb, 
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a humanistic tradition of thought (from the Renaissance through modernity) 
believed to have produced, in Iain Chambers’ words, an oppressive “history of 
possessive subjectivism” (the critical philosophical view).27 Or, finally, in some 
circles (primarily scientific but also cultural studies), the same post/human 
turn has led to a language of hope and (even occasionally giddy) elation over 
all of the ways in which we— whatever “we” might be— might finally be able 
to escape or somehow make less vulnerable or more extensively enjoyable the 
death- haunted “trap” of our all- too- human bodies (the futurist- utopic view).28
 But what is missing from most of these discourses, even when they claim 
to address the question of history, historicism, or  historicity, are the incor-
porated dialogue of scholars who have a deep expertise in premodern stud-
ies (antiquity through the Middle Ages). While the past is often invoked and 
(often crudely) drawn in contemporary theory, it is rarely visited via the route 
of, or unsettled by, actual scholarship in premodern studies— scholarship that 
in recent years has been deeply concerned with issues of the status of the 
human and, in a theoretically sophisticated manner, also calls into question 
the “straight” teleologies and causal explanations of a traditional, or in Wolfe’s 
trans. Chris Turner (London: Verso, 2000); and Langdon Winner, The Reactor and the Whale: 
The Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
 27. Iain Chambers, Culture after Humanism: History, Culture, Subjectivity (London: Rout-
ledge, 2001), 4. For an excellent overview of “critical humanisms,” see Martin Halliwell and 
Andy Mousley, Critical Humanisms: Humanist/Anti- Humanist Dialogues (Edinburgh: Edin-
burgh University Press, 2003). See also Tzvetan Todorov, The Imperfect Garden: The Legacy of 
Humanism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).
 28. On the futurist- utopic (or more affirmative) view, in both scientific and cultural studies, 
see especially Jean Baudrillard, The Ecstasy of Communication, trans. Bernard and Caroline 
Schultze (New York: Semiotext(e), 1988); Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strat-
egies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) and “Why  I Want to Be a Posthuman When  I 
Grow Up,” in Medical Enhancement and Posthumanity, eds. Bert Gordijn and Ruth Chadwick 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 107–37; Rosi Braidotti, Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist The-
ory of Becoming (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002); Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guatarri, A Thousand 
Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, 1987); Judith Halberstam and Ira Livingston, “Introduction: Posthuman Bodies,” 
in Posthuman Bodies, ed. Halberstam and Livingston (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1995), 1–19; Donna Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist- Feminism 
in the Late Twentieth Century,” in Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature, ed. Har-
away (New York: Routledge, 1991), 149–82, and When Species Meet (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2007); Eduardo Kac, Signs of Life: Bio Art and Beyond (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2007); Ray Kurzweil, The Age of Spiritual Machines: When Computers Exceed Human 
Intelligence (New York: Viking, 1999) and The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend 
Biology (New York: Viking, 2005); Hans Moravec, Mind Children: The Future of Robot and 
Human Intelligence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988); Lee Silver, Remaking Eden: Cloning and 
Beyond in a Brave New World (New York: Avon, 1997); and Gregory Stock, Redesigning Humans: 
Our Inevitable Genetic Future (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2002).
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terms an unreflective, historicism.29 Neither is this is a scholarship that Hayles 
worries might adopt the “attitude that there’s nothing that has happened or 
could happen that has not already happened in the past,” but rather, that these 
studies pose the Middle Ages, in  the words of Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, as  an 
“interminable, difficult middle” that stresses “not difference (the past as past) 
or sameness (the past as present),” but “temporal interlacement, the impossi-
bility of choosing alterity or continuity.”30 Although seemingly wholly “Other,” 
the past in these studies is “lodged deep within social and individual iden-
tity, a foundational difference at the heart of the selfsame” and could even be 
described as a kind of “unbounded” space- time that is generative of human 
identity through a “constant movement of irresolvable relations that constitute 
its traumatic effect, an ever- expanding line that arcs back through what has 
been even as it races toward what it shall be.”31 But these are lines of critical 
thought that, for a while now, have been mainly confined to conversations 
among premodernists (who might be discussing with each other, for example, 
 29. Regarding a medieval studies that subverts traditional historicist teleologies, see Kath-
leen Biddick, The Shock of Medievalism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998); Glenn 
Burger and Steven F. Kruger, introduction in Queering the Middle Ages, eds. Burger and Kruger 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), xi–xxiii; Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, “Introduc-
tion: Midcolonial,” in The Postcolonial Middle Ages, ed. Cohen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2000), 1–17, and “Time’s Machines,” in  Medieval Identity Machines, 1–34; Andrew Cole and 
D. Vance Smith, eds., The Legitimacy of the Middle Ages: On the Unwritten History of Theory 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010); Kathleen Davis, Periodization and Sovereignty: 
How Ideas of Feudalism and Secularization Govern the Politics of Time (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Kathleen Davis and Nadia Altschul,  eds., Medievalisms in the 
Postcolonial World: The Idea of the “Middle Ages” Outside Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2009); Carolyn Dinshaw, Getting Medieval: Sexualities and Communities, Pre- 
and Postmodern (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999) and How Soon Is Now? Amateur 
Readers, Medieval Texts, and the Queerness of Time (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012); 
L.  O.  Aranye Fradenburg, Sacrifice Your Love: Psychoanalysis, Historicism, Chaucer (Minne-
apolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002); Amy Hollywood, Sensible Ecstasy: Mysticism, 
Sexual Difference, and the Demands of History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); 
Bruce Holsinger, The Premodern Condition: Medievalism and the Making of Theory (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005); Bruce Holsinger and Ethan Knapp, “The Marxist Premod-
ern,” Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 34.3 (2004): 463–71; Eileen  A. Joy, “Like 
Two Autistic Moonbeams Entering the Window of My Asylum: Chaucer’s Griselda and Lars 
von Trier’s Bess McNeill,” postmedieval: a journal of medieval cultural studies 2.3 (2011): 316–28; 
Eileen A. Joy, Myra J. Seaman, Kimberly Bell, and Mary Ramsey, eds., Cultural Studies of the 
Modern Middle Ages (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Elizabeth Scala and Sylvia Fed-
erico,  eds., The Post- Historical Middle Ages (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); D. Vance 
Smith, “Irregular Histories: Forgetting Ourselves,” New Literary History 28.2 (1997): 161–84; and 
Paul Strohm, “Postmodernism and History,” in  Theory and the Premodern Text,  ed. Strohm 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 149–62.
 30. Cohen, “Introduction: Midcolonial,” 5.
 31. Ibid.
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“old” versus “new” historicist approaches to their subjects of study), and they 
do not always productively connect with the work of humanists (or scientists) 
working in disciplines concerned with more contemporary or post/human 
subjects, and who might view the too distant past as either beside or opposite 
the point. This is not to say that scholars working in premodern studies are 
not ever seeking a more cross- disciplinary or contemporary- minded audience. 
Some of them are, and in pointed fashion, especially in the past several years.32
 It was partly with the idea of both a post/human Middle Ages and an 
approaching post/human era— neither of which can be free of concepts, iden-
tities, and social forms that are always both dead and alive at once— that this 
volume was initially conceptualized. We also formulated the following as ini-
tiatory and guiding questions for our contributors:
• How does the concept (or reality) of the post/human impact the ways we 
develop our notions of humanism, both past and present?
• How do the various historical traditions of humanism (classical, medie-
val, and early modern) productively and antagonistically intersect with 
more modern antihumanisms?
• In what ways might premodern and more modern studies, with respect 
to the vigorous debates over the value (or  lack thereof) of  the liberal 
humanities, form productive alliances across the Enlightenment divide?
• What is the role of the individual, singular person in relation to concepts 
of humanism, past and present?
• What is the role of language and literature in relation to being, body, and 
mind, past and present?
• Is it true, as some have argued, that the individual (and a concomitant 
emphasis on phenomenological inwardness) is a product of modernity 
(or, at  least, of  the post- Enlightenment), or  has the human self, con-
structed in philosophy and other arts, always been “deep”? Or, conversely, 
has the “depth” of human persons always been an illusion?
 32. For example, the mission and projects of the BABEL Working Group (http://babel 
workinggroup .org) have been pitched in this direction. See, for example, the journal post-
medieval: a journal of medieval cultural studies, edited by Eileen A. Joy, Myra Seaman, and Lara 
Farina, which dedicated its inaugural issue in 2010 to the post/human turn and is in continual 
dialogue with scholars across a wide variety of fields and temporal periods (see footnote 17). 
See, also, in recent medieval cultural studies, Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, ed., Prismatic Ecology: Eco-
theory beyond Green (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013); Dinshaw, How Soon Is 
Now?; L. O. Aranye Fradenburg, Staying Alive: A Survival Manual for the Liberal Arts (Brook-
lyn, NY: punctum books, 2013); The Petropunk Collective, Speculative Medievalisms; Cole and 
Smith, eds., Legitimacy of the Middle Ages; and E. R. Truitt, Medieval Robots: Mechanism, Magic, 
Nature, and Art (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015).
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• How does the interplay between singular corporealities and social “bod-
ies” affect our understanding of what it means to be human, both in the 
past and in the present?
• What is the role of the Other (or, more generally, alterity) in our concep-
tions of humanism and “being human,” past and present?
• Is humanism a philosophy, or set of ideas, or a historically situated socio-
critical practice that has lost its raison d’etre, such that it is time for a new 
humanism or no humanism at all? Or is it time to reclaim a new “critical 
humanism” in new modes of address and analysis?
 This last question has special prominence in our collective project. There 
is no doubt that humanism— especially of the variety in which, in Iain Cham-
bers’s words, “the human subject is considered sovereign, language [is] the 
transparent medium of its agency, and truth [is] the representation of its ratio-
nalism”—has a terrible reputation and has been responsible for some of the 
worst atrocities perpetrated in history.33 Furthermore, we are aware that any 
attempt to recuperate humanism now may always come too late if, as Foucault 
supposes in the conclusion to The Order of Things, “man” has already been 
“erased,” like “a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea.”34 Yet even the most 
compelling antihumanist texts— such as Cary Wolfe’s What Is Posthuman-
ism? or Karl Steel’s How to Make a Human— continue, in Kate Soper’s terms, 
to “secrete” humanist rhetoric.35 There is a certain dependence of anti- or post/
humanist discourses upon the space (and languages) of the university human-
ities, where, as Derrida has written, the principle of unconditionality “has an 
originary and privileged place of presentation, of manifestation, of safekeep-
ing” as well as its “space of discussion and reelaboration.” And all of this
passes as much by way of literature and languages (that is, the sciences called 
the sciences of man and culture) as by way of the nondiscursive arts, by way 
of law and philosophy, by way of critique, by way of questioning— where it 
is a matter of nothing less than rethinking the concept of man, the figure of 
humanity in general, and singularly the one presupposed by what we have 
called, in the university, for the last few centuries, the Humanities.36
 33. Chambers, Culture after Humanism, 2–3.
 34. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London: 
Tavistock, 1966), 387.
 35. Kate Soper, Humanism and Anti- Humanism (London: Hutchinson, 1986), 182.
 36. Jacques Derrida, “The University without Condition,” in Derrida, Without Alibi, ed. and 
trans. Peggy Kamuf (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 207 [202–37].
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In this sense, we  might practice what Martin Halliwell and Andy Mousley 
have termed a critical or “baggy” humanism that “takes the human to be an 
open- ended and mutable process.”37 And like Halliwell and Mousley, we might 
develop a new or post/humanism that is “both a pluralistic and a self- critical 
tradition that folds in and over itself, provoking a series of questions and prob-
lems rather than necessarily providing consolation or edification for individ-
uals when faced with intractable economic, political, and social pressures.”38 
This is a humanism that acknowledges, with Chambers, that “being in the 
world does not add up, it never arrives at the complete picture, the conclusive 
verdict. There is always something more that exceeds the frame we desire to 
impose.”39
 A heretofore underdeveloped consideration of the deep past in the post/
humanist project is where we locate our point of entry into the ongoing con-
versation, but the (post/human) present always provides for us the pressing 
questions. We are therefore intensely invested, as Fernand Braudel was in the 
1950s, in the idea that
nothing is more important, nothing comes closer to the crux of social reality, 
than [the] living, intimate, infinitely repeated opposition between the instant 
of time and that time which flows only slowly. Whether it is a question of 
the past or of the present, a clear awareness of this plurality of social time 
is indispensable to the communal methodology of the human sciences.40
As regards our more narrow purview in this volume— literature, history, phi-
losophy, narrative and critical theory, and the arts— we  are especially con-
cerned with developing, from a long or “slow” historical perspective, a critical 
post/humanism that would explore: (1) the significance (historical, sociocul-
tural, psychic, etc.) of  human expression, and affectivity, especially as that 
expression is enmeshed in various ecologies; (2) the impact of technology and 
new sciences on what it means to be a human self; (3) the importance of art 
and literature to defining and enacting human selves; (4)  the importance of 
history in defining and re- membering the human; (5) the artistic plasticity of 
the human; (6) the question of a human collectivity or human “join”: what is 
the value and peril of “being human” or “being post/human” together? and 
 37. Halliwell and Mousley, Critical Humanisms, 2.
 38. Ibid., 16.
 39. Chambers, Culture after Humanism, 2.
 40. Fernand Braudel, “Histoire et sciences sociale: La longue durée,” trans. Sarah Matthews, 
in Histories: French Constructions of the Past, ed. Jacques Revel and Lynn Hunt (New York: The 
New Press, 1995), 117 [115–45].
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finally, (7) the constructive and destructive relations (aesthetic, historical, and 
philosophical) of the human to the nonhuman.
 Following the example of the important three- volume collection edited by 
Michel Feher in 1989, Fragments for a History of the Human Body,41 our vol-
ume is styled as a gathering of fragments toward a history of a humanism that 
could never be rendered in any sort of monolithic totality, especially if one 
is convinced (as we are) by the value of a discontinuist historicism in which 
history is always unfinishable and each temporal period is noncoincident with 
itself. This is to say, no era can be perfectly captured in our hermeneutic nets 
as there is never any “pure” or “whole” period to be captured that isn’t already 
riven by its own contradictions and lack of self- knowledge, especially with 
regard to the active suppression of the fact that the past always inhabits the 
present (often in uncanny ways), and that the “contemporary” is never really 
the radical “break” with the past that it often believes itself to be. As Dominick 
LaCapra has cautioned, each period is always “beset with its own disruptions, 
lacunae, conflicts, irreparable losses, belated recognitions, and challenges to 
identity,”42 and part of the aim of our volume is to make this state of affairs 
more visible, especially with regard to the supposedly postmodern genesis of 
the post/human. Similar to Feher and company’s aim to provide the broadest 
and most temporally and geographically varied coverage of the human body’s 
discontinuist history, while also insisting that that same human body is always 
constructed, always a social formation, and always representational, we  too 
insist on the always provisional and contingent formations of the human, and 
of various humanisms, over time, while also aiming to demonstrate the differ-
ent ways in which these formations emerge (and also disappear) in different 
times and places. There can thus be no “total history” of this state of affairs as 
it plays itself out in differing historical contexts, but nevertheless, we can see 
at the same time that defining what “the human” is has always been an agon— 
always an ongoing, never finished social- cultural- political project. We say also 
a “vanishing” humanism, mainly to denote the ways in which, as noted above, 
the foundations of the liberal humanist subject have been roundly critiqued 
and dismantled in many university discourses, and thus, appears as a “van-
ishing” figure in the contemporary scene. Indeed, following Foucault’s asser-
tion in The Order of Things that “man” is an invention of a more recent date 
than most believe, our volume aims also to demonstrate that the contours 
of the human figure and the humanisms attached to that figure have always 
 41. Michel Feher, ed. (with Ramona Naddaff and Nadia Tazi), Fragments for a History of 
the Human Body, 3 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Zone Books, 1989).
 42. Dominick LaCapra, History and Memory after Auschwitz (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univer-
sity Press, 1998), 24. 
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been— on both sides of the so- called Enlightenment divide— indeterminate, 
contestable, slippery, and ephemeral. Post/humanism, as philosophy and also 
methodology, would best be framed, we believe, by an attention to longer and 
discontinuist, historical perspectives.
 The volume is divided into two sections: the first part (Singularity, Species, 
Inter/faces) focuses on critical issues that circulate around questions of human 
“singularity” and human “species,” with faces, visages, facades, and/or inter-
faces serving as the most explicit thought props through which each author 
approaches the question of human being and human becoming, as well as the 
undoing of the human. The second part of the volume (Human, Inhuman, 
Spectacle) concentrates on the relations of the human to the inhuman and the 
difficulties attendant upon maintaining any sort of line between the two, espe-
cially vis- à- vis the analysis of certain aesthetic (and often surreal) spectacles 
designed to provoke wonder and horror, and to also destabilize the human as 
a figure of so- called “rational” and/or “humane” impulses. Although all of the 
essays in the book can be read productively in relation to each other (because 
each essay, in  one form or another, takes up the question of the status— 
epistemological, ontological, psychic, historical, cultural, aesthetic, and so 
on— of the human being), the division of the book’s contents has been struc-
tured to highlight, in the first section, the historical and critical problematics 
surrounding the attempts (both in the past and the present) to delineate “the 
human” as a singularity (whether as an individual or as a unique species), 
and in the second section, to  foreground the ethical and cultural dilemmas 
that arise when the human is marked off from, but also merges with, what 
is supposedly nonhuman or inhuman. Each section begins with what might 
be called the most historically mute period— the so- called “prehistoric” (the 
chapters by Jeffrey Skoblow and Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, respectively)—and then 
includes chapters that consider instants and events of modern critical thought 
and/or culture (such as, for example, Claude Romano’s “evential” hermeneu-
tics, the surrealist biology of Roger Caillois, the iPod, Freud, Derrida’s turn to 
the animal, biopolitical theory, George Lucas’s THX 1138, and Samuel Beck-
ett’s Molloy) in relation to the slower currents of premodern thought and cul-
ture that still inhere in the present (such as, for example, the heroic quest, 
the devotional manual, the Oedipus myth, the chivalric romance, historical 
saga, and the idealized Lady of troubadour poetry). Finally, the essay by Craig 
Dionne on Shakespeare, the post/human, and aesthetics constitutes the cau-
tionary cultural- materialist coda to the volume, alerting us, after immersion 
in the contents of this volume, that while we “must not turn our backs to 
the subaltern stories outside the manor” (the post/human), we “must [also] 
be mindful not to aestheticize . . . bare life.” In other words, to  speak of the 
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post/human (if even in literary texts) is to call attention to forms of life more 
broadly, and also to liveliness and processes of living, and thus we must be 
careful to consider the material (“on the ground”) conditions that undergird 
our theorizing, for living itself (human and otherwise) is at stake.
PART I: SINGULARITIES, SPECIES, INTER/FACES
Jeffrey Skoblow opens his discussion of palaeolithic images at Chauvet and 
Rouffignac in France with a timeline. The paintings and engravings, some 
13,000 years old, resemble others extant from the period throughout Europe 
that are 35,000–40,000 years old. By comparison, the earliest tools, such as 
a symmetrical hand ax, are 100,000 years old, and Skoblow judiciously sug-
gests we should include them in the catalogue of human representations. Also, 
80,000-year- old burials that associate ochre with human remains imply the 
existence, at that time, of the belief that there is another, or a parallel, life in 
addition to the present one.
 All these manifestations exist in a near- vacuum: we  know little about 
the contexts that surround them. Thus, these human representations are not 
unlike things or animals: as  Georges Bataille phrased it, “Whatever has no 
meaning for itself is a thing.”43 However closely we attend to them, the results 
of our efforts are meager. And yet, some paradigms emerge. For instance, the 
vast majority of portraits bear “no apparent figuratively human dimension: the 
delicate and expressive muzzles of horses, aurochs and lions, bison and mam-
moth eyes, horses’ manes and bison beards and so on” predominate (48). With 
more schematic images, such as dots or V- shapes, interpretation is guesswork. 
A pointy shape can be thingly, animal, or female: “an arrow, a bird track, or a 
vulva” (49, quoted from Bahn, 159–60). What does that teach us about the 
human? Skoblow warns that even the modest categories— male/female, ani-
mal/human, whole/fragment— used to group these images may be anachro-
nistic. But, as he consoles us, at her most vulnerable, the prehistoric human is 
also the most recognizable: we can easily embrace undecidability.
 Skoblow describes what it was like to be in the caves themselves:
Mammoths, horses, bison, rhinos, and ibex required us to walk around in 
circles and backwards with our heads back, looking up and spinning to keep 
the images straight, to see them in their orientations as they crisscrossed and 
 43. Georges Bataille, Death and Sensuality: A Study of Eroticism and the Taboo, trans. Mary 
Dalwood (New York: Walker and Company, 1962), 157.
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overlapped and spread across in their rough arc. All are filled with calm, 
even the ibex running with legs at full stretch, many with eyes that look back 
at you. Our guide answered questions and by way of wrapping up on the way 
back, he said, as I understood him, that “of the people who made these things 
we know nothing but one thing: they are us”—or he may have said “we are 
them” which, if not exactly the same, amounts to the same thing: what could 
only be called human. (47–48)
We might say that the cave visitors, then and now, as in Japanese literary con-
texts, “look like they know mono no aware”—that is, they look like poets. 
We  can imagine that cave space filled with sighs: aware cho [“to sigh after 
being stirred by something”].
 Eileen A. Joy’s “Eros, Event, and Non- Faciality in Malory’s ‘Tale of Balyn 
and Balan’” never departs from that sigh- poem space of shared awareness. 
In De civitate dei, Augustine wrote that, unlike all other living creatures and 
animals, God chose to create the entire race of man from only one individual 
to bind humans “not only by similarity of nature, but . . . affection.”44 Against 
Augustine’s optimism, Joy argues, most contemporary social theorists— for 
example, Zygmunt Bauman, Ulrich Beck, Elisabeth Beck- Gernsheim, Anthony 
Giddens, Scott Lash— regard the late modern individual, as  opposed to the 
premodern person, as cut loose from social bonds. She does not even retain, 
as a remainder, her own intact selfhood— whatever “intact” might mean. Lash 
calls her “a  combinard” who “puts together networks, constructs alliances, 
makes deals,” and lives in a world of risk and precariousness.45
 Joy argues that the human has always been in the process of coming 
unstuck from the consolations of local times and places, and tightly woven 
family groups, partly because the idea of the heroic individual mastering the 
world— whether the knight in Camelot or the financier on Wall Street— has 
been essential to the valorization of the human subject, while at the same time, 
that same heroic individual can only ever really succeed or fail on the terms 
set by the group from which she is always coming undone. In Malory’s Morte 
darthur, Joy’s test case, Balyn, “the knight with two swords,” is  a medieval 
combinard just as multi- local and non- linear as Bauman’s “liquid modernity.” 
Joy asserts that this contradicts the accounts of the supposedly monolithic and 
 44. Robert Flint, The Philosophy of History in Europe, vol. 1. London: William Blackwood 
and Sons, 1874.
 45. Scott Lash, “Foreword: Individualization in a Non- Linear Mode,” in  Individualiza-
tion: Institutionalized Individualism and Its Social and Political Consequences, eds. Ulrich Beck 
and Elisabeth Beck- Gernsheim and trans. Patrick Camiller. London: Sage Publications, 2002, 
ix [vii–xiii].
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unified premodernity that acts as a backdrop against which, to  paraphrase 
Carolyn Dinshaw, the modern and postmodern “groovily emerge.”46
 Joy argues that “almost all of our notions of time and temporality are insuf-
ficient to [its] weirdness and ungraspability . . . what might be called time’s 
continual and dissonant ‘forking’” (55). She reaches out to philosopher Claude 
Romano’s “evential hermeneutics” to argue for a conception of the human 
person as a type of queer location (a  “highly localized site of awareness” in 
the terminology of medieval historian David Gary Shaw47) that is always in 
the process of “becoming” through the “impersonal events of the world” that 
never cease “happening” to it (60). In  this scenario, Balyn becomes “a  nas-
cently (or proto-)modern human individual” who is “thrust, through aventure, 
into the ‘compulsive and obligatory self- determination’ of a certain alienating 
pastmodernity” (56). Balyn is not so much a preexisting (and stably human) 
identity, as  he is “a  break within the flow” of the “absolute consciousness” 
(60) of the assemblage of Camelot, especially when caught in the flux of the 
events of his narrative, which he can never know in advance. Here, there is no 
becoming- human, only a “taking place” in a becoming- world (64).
 Tim Spence’s “The Book of Hours and iPods, Passionate Lyrics and 
Prayers” weaves parallels between two media platforms— the medieval prayer 
book and the personal music device playlist. For Spence, the overarching issue 
that brings the prayer book and iPods together is “the personal verification 
and comfort that stems from the habitual use of devotional technologies” (80). 
Prayers and contemporary songs are also alike in that both rely on a limited 
vocabulary of personal suffering, particularly in love and love-longing,” both 
forms are intentionally composed in a highly lyrical manner, filled with pathos, 
and both can be used at will by individual agents to manipulate moods.
 Spence divides history into three periods— medieval, modern, and 
digital— as  he compares prayer manuals and mp3 players, devotional songs 
and rock- n- roll lyrics, all as technologies that individualize us and “allow us 
 46. Dinshaw writes: “Radical hybridity of postmodern identities is bought at the cost of 
the medieval. Merely displacing rather than eliminating totality (as Paul Strohm has remarked 
in relation to other postmodern theorists), [Homi] Bhabha produces via a convenient and sim-
plified Benedict Anderson a binary modernist narrative of history— produces a dense, obvious 
(and white) Middle Ages against which the arbitrary modern groovily emerges— though he 
routinely critiques such binary narratives in decrying ‘teleology and holism.’ And this totalizing 
force applies pressure elsewhere in Bhabha’s work; it  is no coincidence (at  least to this queer 
medievalist) that his treatment of an undifferentiated, homogeneous distant past intersects with 
his treatment of sexuality”: Carolyn Dinshaw, “Queer Relations,” Essays in Medieval Studies 16 
(1999): 93 [79–94].
 47. David Gary Shaw, Necessary Conjunctions: The Social Self in Medieval England (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 12.
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immediate access to our private passions” (91). The twelfth- century Victorines 
(Hugh, Adam, and others) were instrumental in composing and propagat-
ing prayers on Christ’s Passion and other practices, later anthologized in the 
Books of Hours, allowing practitioners to interact “with their prayer books to 
discover appropriate material for their prayers and meditations, either scripted 
or original” (69). These practices involved “complex technologies— some cog-
nitive, some concrete,” including books, decorations, architectural spaces, cal-
endars, and clocks (69).
 Just beyond the edge of the historical density of these technologies, 
ca.  1500, Spence locates the birthplace— or  perhaps more accurately, the 
College House— of  Mr.  Cogito, the character in Zbigniew Herbert’s poems 
who embodies “the ironic contrast between an individual borne aloft in an 
untimely manner by his inner thoughts and the chaotic circumstances in 
which he finds himself, a world always just outside of the thinking being’s con-
trol” (71). As Spence argues, “Mr. Cogito replaced Mr. Oratio— or the medie-
val deference to devotional prayer— at the moment introspective meditation 
stopped producing prayers and began producing subjective analysis for the 
self- reflective individual’s independent self ” (71).
 To console herself in her untimely predicament, today’s Mlle  Cogito 
participates in a field of technologies that mirror the medieval Mr. Oratio’s: 
“a  network of technologies . . . woven together to form a very intimate and 
sensual relationship between the individual user and a larger, corporate 
body of being” (72). If  for Mr.  Oratio that corporation was ecclesiastic, for 
Mlle  Cogito it is, perhaps less glamorously, capitalist. Spence skillfully and 
dizzyingly juxtaposes the Beguines and the band the Weather Underground, 
the rosary and the iPod, Goliards and college students, Carmina Burana and 
the band Public Enemy, the mystic Richard Rolle and the band Modest Mouse, 
dying in a tavern and overdosing, the Word made Flesh and the Digital Age 
Word that “has become electric.” Spence concludes that the study of medieval 
prayer rituals renders more accessible certain aspects of the digital age that are 
obscured because of our immersion in them, especially the corporatization of 
private emotions and the role of the conveyances in habituating our emotions 
to function within a larger corporate structure that is both “omnipresent and 
invisible” (88).
 Daniel Remein and Anna Kłosowska, in  “What Does Language Speak: 
Feeling the Human with Samuel Beckett and Chrétien de Troyes,” read Per-
ceval (ca. 1165) and Molloy (1951) near to each other. Following Heidegger and 
structuralism, they ask: if language speaks, what is the status of the human— 
human desire and subjectivity? Perceval and Molloy both have an interesting 
time naming themselves: their similarities rift the space- time of literary and 
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intellectual history, but the essay is still careful to “not wrest what it calls away 
from the re /moteness.”48
 Remein and Kłosowska argue that it is the very moment when Molloy 
and Perceval realize and say aloud their names that a strange infatuation or 
erotic fixation on an object emerges, recalling the Japanese principle of mono 
no aware, or the Virgilian lacrimae rerum, mentioned earlier in this introduc-
tion. In Molloy’s case, this fixation “amounts to a potential incident of public 
inanimaphiliac intimacy with a bicycle that seems mechanically impossible” 
(99). Rather more sublimely, Perceval is transfixed by the procession of a can-
delabra, a  bleeding lance, and the grail. Again, in  a striking parallel to the 
principles of mono no aware, Perceval is punished for failing to ask questions 
about the condition of the Fisher King and thus failing to share his story, the 
sharing of which is portrayed as the only form of relief for what ails not only 
the king but also an entire kingdom, turned into a wasteland. Passing from 
Heidegger to Lacan, Deleuze, and Graham Harman’s speculative materialism, 
Kłosowska and Remein borrow from Reza Negarestani the phrase “complicity 
with anonymous materials”49 to point out three similarities between Perceval 
and Molloy. First, the narrative structure and content, from the description 
of the objects (radiance and light) to the hero’s naming. Second, the objects 
in the narratives are not part of nature but rather they are semiautonomous, 
“somewhere in between tool and matter” (106). Third, these same objects 
short- circuit the grand isolation of humans from the world of nonhumans.
 Remein and Kłosowska use Graham Harman’s term allure, a  “touch 
without touching,” to  describe the object’s fetching agency. No  longer inert 
or inhuman, Harman’s object is radiant matter that, as  in medieval physics, 
sends out beams that effect a cure or provoke longing, passion, and madness. 
Kłosowska and Remein ask what allure/relation is between the radiant matter, 
and the being, at the moment of naming— in terms of how they relate to what 
we would want to call human, and they conclude that poetry is the “erotic 
radiance of language caught on and besotted by fragments” (125). Second, 
they claim that Chrétien writes enough episodes of erotic co- operations or 
hybridizations with nonhuman matter to be reclaimed as a Beckettian mod-
ernist avant la lettre. Reading Chrétien, they submit, is  the best training to 
take pleasure in Beckett— to laugh, frolic, and absurdly giggle as we imagine 
Molloy with his red rubber bicycle bulb, instead of shrinking from this and 
other Beckettian texts as if they were grey clouds dripping dour pessimism.
 48. Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstader (New York: 
Harper, 1971), 196.
 49. Reza Negarestani, Cyclonopedia: Complicity with Anonymous Materials (Melbourne: 
re.press, 2008).
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PART II: HUMAN, INHUMAN, SPECTACLE
In “Aninormality,” Jeffrey Jerome Cohen asks: what is the role of nonhuman 
agents in art? Take, for example, the three drops of blood on the snow in Chré-
tien’s Perceval or the famous winter scene in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight: 
no  amount of research on “Ricardian kingship or contemporary Welsh- 
English relations” (132) (the human and historical context) can explain their 
intensity, but neither can research on snowflakes or goose blood (the nonhu-
man context). Cohen turns to Roger Caillois’s 1934 essay on the praying man-
tis: intrigued by the mantis that plays dead, Caillois notes that her behavior 
inspires a strange situational lyricism in the driest entomological accounts.50 
Caillois concludes that myths are not only inspired by social phenomena 
but also by striking natural ones: a slight instance of nonhuman agency, but 
agency nonetheless. This serves as Cohen’s departure point for a consideration 
of the nonhuman as it is bound up with the human in medieval fabulist art.
 Cohen highlights a passage in Caillois’s writing on stone,51 where Caillois 
talks of the intensities of various agents in three “kingdoms”—geological, veg-
etal, animal. To  each kingdom’s particular density corresponds a particular 
wavelength, speed, or  frequency of its art, and since the art is set at differ-
ent speeds, the mutual reading of each kingdom’s art produces the effect of a 
blurred presence. If we really concentrate our attention, as Caillois and Cohen 
urge, that presence can be brought out in sharper relief. They both invoke 
the term commonality to represent this network of mutually recognizable 
(if  blurry) yet also imperfectly perceived signals of nonhuman agents that 
together make up the “aesthetics of the universe.”52 For Caillois, the “mobi-
lizing element” of this commonality across kingdoms is beauty, a  general 
“innate lyricism,” a  shared “universal syntax.”53 “Natural fantasy” is another 
name Caillois gives to that nonhuman agency.54 Caillois does not propose an 
“evolutionary, cultural or symbolic use value” (140) for nonhuman agency; 
instead, suggests Cohen, Caillois’s idea is that impulse, mobility, or  agency 
are the normal states of the three kingdoms— what Cohen labels their aninor-
mality, a  suitcase word that brings together the ideas of the animal and the 
anomalous to break up the definition of normalcy.
 50. Roger Caillois, “The Praying Mantis: From Biology to Psychoanalysis,” in The Edge of 
Surrealism: A Roger Caillois Reader (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 66–81.
 51. Roger Caillois, The Writing of the Stones, ed. Marguerite Yourcenar, trans. Barbara Bray 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1985).
 52. Ibid., 49.
 53. Ibid., 104.
 54. Ibid., 84.
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 Against the anxiety that thinking in terms of the nonhuman is tanta-
mount to thinking unkindly or unethically, with “pessimism, even misan-
thropy” (139), Cohen argues that posthumanism is not less but more caring in 
trying to “view the world through a less anthropocentric lens” (139). Cohen 
locates “medieval aninormality” (140) at work in Geoffrey of Monmouth’s His-
tory of the Kings of Britain (ca. 1136) and also in the work of Marie de France 
(ca.  1160), who weaves a lyrical world of human- animal and human- object 
hybrids: man- wolf, man- osprey, talking deer, not to mention adventure plots 
that turn on bits of cloth, knots, and sticks. Cohen’s attention to the final image 
of the earth, in whose porous cavities the heroine of Marie de France’s Yonec 
discovers slumbering lovers ready to spring into action in yet- unnarrated sto-
ries that mirror her own, helps us to see what Cohen means by inhuman art: 
the transformative potentiality of stories that always already inheres in the 
geological crevasses of their landscapes.
 In “Humanist Waste,” Michael  A. Johnson challenges the periodization 
where Renaissance humanism overcomes the medieval, and postmodern post-
humanism overcomes the Enlightenment humanist subject. The Middle Ages, 
in this periodization, bears persistent material traces of “concepts, identities, 
and social forms that are always both dead and alive at once” (152). Because 
“dead and alive at once” has a decidedly excremental ring to it, Johnson’s cri-
tique of periodization logically focuses on waste. Johnson cites two sides of 
one particular debate over periodization: representing the medieval trouba-
dour tradition as “proto- humanist,” or as antihumanist or inhuman— a tradi-
tion, as Johnson points out, “in which a persistent metaphorics of excrement 
troubles the question of the human” (152). Johnson looks, in  medieval and 
more modern contexts, at technologies of waste disposal, literary and philo-
sophical metaphors of waste, the complex interplay of individual and commu-
nity “haunted by animal excrement” (152), and waste as a metaphor for a loss 
of meaning.
 Johnson first takes us through the psychoanalytics of excrement. 
He  explains that according to Lacan (via Žižek), the problem of waste dis-
posal is linked to interiority and the distinction between human and animal: 
humans face shit disposal as a problem, while for animals, lacking an ‘inte-
rior’ of the sort humans experience, shit—this exteriorization of what was 
once interior—poses no problems. For Freud, the degree of separation from 
waste— through different means of disposal, repression, and sublimation— is a 
measure of civilization. Repression may go too far, as  in the science fiction 
dystopian commonplace of the food pill that eliminates eating and waste, 
perceived negatively as the “imposition of an inhuman exteriority” (154) that 
is accompanied by other measures that erase interiority and individuality. 
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A  similar example that Johnson turns to is George Lucas’s film THX 1138, 
where the protagonist “inserts his wages, in the form of a colored dodecahe-
dron, into a toilet- like device, as though to eliminate the process of consump-
tion and waste altogether” (154), the “toilet” serving as “a vestigial trace of its 
original function,” an  absurd scenario that explains why later THX cannot 
mourn his mate: THX and others have “no interior, no ‘private self,’ because 
they do not shit” (155).
 Parallel to Karl Steel’s discussion of the superlative deliciousness of human 
flesh (see below), Johnson studies texts that laud the superiority of human 
excrement. This excellence notwithstanding, waste also stands in metaphor-
ically for a collapse of difference, hierarchy, and value. Johnson guides us 
through Baudrillard, Freud, and Alenka Zupančič’s reading of Lacan, to focus 
on Lacan’s Seminar VII on sublimation, a point (many scholars agree) when 
Lacan moves from mostly abstract and structuralist language to a more 
embodied image of subjectivity. Johnson shows that troubadour poetry fre-
quently combines the excremental, the animal, and the feminine, while at the 
same time these poems “plug up” the Lady’s “explosive and filthy materiality 
through the technological prosthetics of writing” (166). With Lacan, Johnson 
uses the “scene” of fin’amors as a pattern that may help us rethink the human 
in and against this late- capitalist paradigm we currently inhabit.
 Karl Steel’s “How Delicious We Must Be / Folcuin’s Horse and the Dog’s 
Gowther, Beyond Care” looks at medieval discourses of anthropophagy as a 
ground of distinction between humans and animals, demonstrating that the 
binary is never successfully fixed in place. While most treatments of medieval 
anthropophagy use it as a metaphor— of  profanation of the Host; of  exces-
sive cruelty or illegitimate government; of the painful formation of subjectiv-
ity, allowing psychoanalytic discussions— such metaphorical readings partly 
efface the visceral horror that Steel aims to restore.
 The distinction between flesh and meat is like the distinction between 
human and animal, the animate— literally, “ensouled,” or possessed of a soul 
or anima— and the inanimate. To show how blurry that distinction is, Steel 
summarizes Christian theories of life, including the commonplace under-
standing brought to the fore in Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer that animals 
possess mere biological life, zoe rather than bios.55 The distinctive human char-
acteristics that animals lack are usually defined as reason, language, and soul. 
Paradoxically, since the humans are superior to animals, their flesh must taste 
 55. See Agamben’s introduction to Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Dan-
iel Heller- Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).
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better than animal flesh. This rather too literal appreciation for human supe-
riority is explicit, as  Steel shares, in  many medieval texts, including Poggio 
Bracciolini’s tale of a teenage serial killer, a fifteenth- century hunting manual 
of Edward of York, the story of king Cadwallo in Geoffrey of Monmouth’s 
History, the Middle English romance Richard Coer de Lyon, the Chanson d’An-
tioche, Marco Polo’s account of Japanese customs, and John Mandeville’s sim-
ilar account of the people of Lamore, which all describe human flesh as “the 
most restorative and most delicious” of meats (176).
 Steel asks: what work does the distinction between eating animal and 
human flesh do? He  suggests that the distinction is not intrinsic but rather 
constructed, a  “carnophallogocentrism,” as  Derrida called it in The Animal 
That Therefore  I Am.56 This makes the horror of anthropophagy seem less 
noble: not a horror of violating the human, but a horror of violating the 
human privilege, human “exemption from routine violence.” Next, Steel exam-
ines medieval alternatives, wherein “medieval people could imagine other 
relations to the animal, less concerned with violence and saving human priv-
ilege” (185). Noting that Cary Wolfe in Animal Rites discounts the meaning 
of such examples for the cultural paradigm because they are exceptions that 
confirm the rule—“the logic of the pet . . . the individual who is exempted 
from the slaughter in order to vindicate, with exquisite bad faith, a  sacrifi-
cial structure”57—Steel argues against Wolfe by focusing on two texts where 
exceptions to the sacrificial economy are never explicitly claimed to serve 
some purpose, but rather seem to be “interruptions of economy” (idylls or 
utopias, even stories of companionship): Folcuin of Lobbes’s story of a horse 
that led the funeral procession of its saintly master and afterward refused to 
carry anyone, and also the Middle English romance Sir Gowther, whose hero 
commits heinous crimes, after which the Pope prescribes as a penance a diet 
of food snatched from a dog’s mouth. A greyhound feeds him “whyte loafe” 
until Gowther is ready to “forthe gon”—fight and snatch food forcibly from 
other dogs— in  a three- day “hillside idyll” (188). In  such stories, says Steel, 
we learn to “suspend ourselves between two impossibilities: the unjustifiable 
need to defend ourselves from the appetite of others, and the dizzying fact of 
temporary mattering, our own and others, within a near universal indiffer-
ence, where we must make cuts to care, even if what we protect takes no notice 
of us at all” (192).
 56. Jacques Derrida, The Animal that Therefore I Am, ed. Marie- Louise Mallet, trans. David 
Wills (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 93.
 57. Cary Wolfe, Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist 
Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 104.
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 Daniel Kline’s essay, “Excusing Laius: Freud’s Oedipus, Sophocles’ Oedipus 
Rex, and Lydgate’s Edippus,” shows how the focus of Lydgate’s story, different 
from Sophocles’, can allow us to read the story of Oedipus differently from 
Freud, more along the lines of Emmanuel Lévinas’s critique of Freud. Kline 
examines the genesis of Freud’s theory of the Oedipal complex, citing Lévinas’s 
critique of psychoanalysis as the “end result” of a rationalism— in other words, 
a humanism— that fails to account for realities more profound than ourselves 
and that are, ultimately, beyond our intentions. For Kline,
Freud’s Oedipal complex isolates aggression in the child and obfuscates 
parental responsibility for that violence in much the same way Oedipus Rex 
seems to condemn Oedipus. Thus, the father’s violence against the child and 
the necessity of that violence in constituting the patriarchal family is relo-
cated from age to youth, from external world to internal fantasies, and from 
the social realm to the intrapsychic. (194)
And yet, in the Oedipus story, “the Sphinx’s riddle inheres in the paradox of 
aging and of retaining identity or sameness within temporal difference” (194). 
To push against this forgetting of the riddle and against making actual vio-
lence in Oedipus only a symbol, and at that, the relatively benign symbol of 
the social apprenticeship of the healthy individual, Kline underlines that “the 
Oedipus narrative begins not with the child’s violence against the parents, but 
with attempted infanticide” (195), and he thus shows that Freud’s account of 
Oedipus was a very particular choice, given his knowledge of other versions 
of the story.
 Unlike the Sophocles version that assumes our knowledge of the back-
story, medieval versions provide “prologues” to the episodes of patricide and 
incest, somewhat decentering the latter episodes crucial to Sophocles and 
Freud. Freud dismissed postclassical versions as religious rewritings that were 
supposed to inspire piety. Kline walks us through Freud’s library in London, 
stopping at Léopold Constans’s 1881 volume on twelfth- century French rendi-
tions of Oedipus that Freud heavily marked on almost every page, indicating 
that medieval versions of the story influenced Freud’s thinking on the Oedipal 
Complex.
 As Kline explains, Lydgate’s Siege of Thebes is likewise based on these 
French renditions, and Kline attends to the ways in which Lydgate baroquely 
expanded the encounter with the Sphinx. This provides Kline grounds for a 
Lévinasian reading that “dismantles the hierarchy of father over son, of parent 
over child, by observing that the father’s exteriority, most clearly present in 
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the other who calls the father to responsibility, is found in, but is not reducible 
to, the child” (221). Lydgate’s “generous and humane” (216) account of Oedi-
pus emphasizes the responsibilities inherent in the parent- child relationship. 
Conversely, in Lydgate, somewhat surprisingly to modern critics, the horror 
of incest and patricide committed by Oedipus is not emphasized as much. 
As Kline suggests, that again allows us to think of Lydgate along the lines of 
Lévinas and not Freud: “If Freud sees Oedipus as the universal human sub-
ject, the autonomous individual who acts in history, Lydgate’s Edippus is the 
exemplary individual who is tethered to” history (222). Lydgate’s Lévinasian 
Oedipus is a creature of “change, not stasis; is embedded in culture, not iso-
lated; adapts to the vagaries of age and change; and remains firmly wedded to 
the warp and woof of history” (222).
 In the volume’s cautionary coda, “The Trick of Singularity: Twelfth Night, 
Stewards of the Posthuman, and the Problem of Aesthetics,” Craig Dionne 
reflects on the crisis of the humanities and asks, how are literature and culture 
relevant if they do not “directly speak to the complexity of the modern world?” 
(224). Dionne closes with an indelible image from Trevor Nunn’s film version 
of Twelfth Night: Feste is banished to the dark world outside. The spectator, 
placed in the same dark space as Feste, observes the wedding feast through the 
glowing warm windows of the manor. Dionne enjoins those of us invested in 
the posthuman turn to not “turn our backs to the subaltern stories outside the 
manor” (243). We must be mindful of our responsibility to shape a more just 
society in economic and practical senses.
 Dionne opens by evoking Robert Scholes’s 2004 MLA presidential address, 
“The Humanities in a Post- Human World,” concerned with religious funda-
mentalism and the so- called “pragmatic” or “real” neoconservative politics, 
as  well as economics not invested in practices of care. Against the associa-
tion of the term posthuman with these neoconservative political and fanat-
ical religious values that go against the humanities, Dionne defines posthu-
manism as a label for a constellation of theorists and social critics working 
on the same problem but from positions within different critical discourses, 
including cyborg theory, informatics, systems theory, queer studies, the turn 
to the body and to animal rights, new materialism and the turn to ontology, 
theories coalesced around the BABEL Working Group, and scholars such as 
Cary Wolfe, Katherine Hayles, Cora Diamond, Ian Hacking, Ralph Acampora, 
Judith Butler, and others.
 In Twelfth Night, Dionne sees an already postmodern play that hinges on 
the problem of defining a singular identity in the face of modernity’s blur-
ring of identities, as opposed to a humanist reading of the play as a rehearsal 
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of “Renaissance melancholy or self- consuming love” (228). Among others, 
Dionne reads Malvolio as “a crude parody of Tudor humanist learning that 
is meant to bolster traditional venues of social ascension through courtly ser-
vice” (234) and shows that Malvolio is the exponent of the unorganic, posthu-
man concept of the subject. Lastly, Dionne sees Malvolio’s story as a parable 
of the academic. Malvolio’s contradictory use of materialist language that 
“speaks us” and individual agency at the same time presages our own plight: 
“the problem of establishing an aesthetics of difference during a time of great 
economic, political, and ecological instability— a strangely familiar reminder 
for humanists that our own professional longing to return to aesthetics might 
replay something of a return of the repressed” (227).
 Dionne closes with an image of reversible consciousness, like the chamois 
glove that can be turned inside out. If Frederic Jameson’s A Singular Modernity 
attributes to film as a medium the rise of the postmodern experience of and 
preoccupation with contingency— a moviegoer emerging into the bright light 
experiences the shock of contingency— Dionne notes Twelfth Night’s obsession 
with this problem. We may have brought it to new heights— for example, “in a 
world of digitalized textual production— out- sourced and team- written texts 
that appear on the computer screen in a stream from a placeless nowhere”—
but the problem was always already there in Orsino’s “manic love,” “a miming 
of the itinerant identity that appropriates its oscillating emotional states and 
shifting standpoints as a form of courtly pastime” (240). It was already there 
in the figure of Feste and the play’s obsession with contingency and bare life, 
which should force us to examine the conditions of our posthumanist work in 
our own “manor.”
ALL THE WAY TO THE VEGAN DEMON
Jean de la Fontaine (1621–95) once wrote: “If a lute played by itself, I would 
run away, although I passionately love music.”58 La Fontaine says this à propos 
of a scene in Apuleius’s Psyche, which he translated, where the young woman, 
Psyche, marries a powerful man whom she cannot see, Cupid, and lives in a 
castle surrounded by a post/human kind of opulence and love: a castle filled 
with invisible servants and musicians. The tableau of post/human musical per-
formance is so insufferable for La Fontaine that he adds harp- playing nymphs 
to explain where the music comes from. But anyone who has seen Jean 
 58. Jean de la Fontaine, “Preface,” Amours de Psiché et de Cupidon (Paris: Claude Barbin, 
1669), n.p. This phrase is picked up in André Gide’s Journal (13 October 1927).
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Cocteau’s 1946 film La Belle et la bête is aware that charm and grace, desire 
and pleasure don’t need human agents: a partly human beast, rows of moving 
disembodied hands, and other human fragments all contribute to a breath-
taking love story. In La Fontaine’s own seventeenth century, extended thought 
experiments relegated humans to insignificance, as in a reflection on cabbage 
in Cyrano de Bergerac’s famous science fiction novel, State and Empire of the 
Moon (1657). Bergerac’s protagonist encounters a vegan Demon so particular 
that he will only eat those vegetables that died of natural causes. Harvesting a 
live cabbage, wounding it with a knife, would have been unconscionable and 
unnatural:
Is not this cabbage, as you are, a part of Nature? Is  she— Nature— not the 
mother of both of you equally? It even seems to me that she made provi-
sions with a greater urgency for the vegetative rather than for the reasonable 
kind, since she left the engendering of men to the caprice of their fathers 
who can, as they please, engender them or not: a stricture with which she 
did not, however, choose to afflict the cabbage: because instead of leaving 
the germination of the sons to the fathers’ discretion, as  if she were more 
apprehensive that the cabbage race might die out than the human race, she 
constrained them willy nilly to give being to one another, and not at all as 
it is with men, who only engender children by caprice, and who can only 
engender twenty at the most throughout their lifetime; while cabbages can 
produce four hundred thousand per head. To  say that Nature loved man 
more than cabbage is to tickle yourself to make yourself laugh. . . . add that 
man cannot be born without sin . . . while we know full well that the first 
cabbage had never offended its Creator.59
And then, in  the Demon’s imaginary account, the cabbage speaks. That, 
as Joanna Zylinska insists, is a neat way to think about the ethics of the post/
human turn. “What if x responded?” can be a useful touchstone in theorizing 
the ethics of the nonhuman. As Zylinska says, when we dismantle the hierar-
chy, we open the possibility of a better ethics. An ethics that is open ended, 
based on “a  prior demand on those of us who call themselves humans to 
respond to the difference of the world critically and responsibly, without tak-
ing recourse all too early to pre- decided half- truths.”60 As we follow Zylinska, 
 59. Cyrano de Bergerac, Histoire comique des etats et empire de la lune, in Oeuvres, vol. 2 
(Amsterdam: Jacques Desbordes, 1709), 83–85.
 60. Joanna Zylinska, “Bioethics Otherwise, or, How to Live with Machines, Humans, and 
Other Animals,” in Telemorphosis: Theory in the Era of Climate Change, vol. 1, ed. Tom Cohen 
(Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press/MPublishing), 2012. (203–25).
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let us take comfort in the familiarity of the thought exercise that allows us to 
imagine “x” responding, a post/human exercise that by far predates what we 
call modernity, as this volume well attests.
 Thought experiments, texts, narratives, and other ways to think with, and 
not merely about, nonhumans are collected in the chapters of this volume. 
These chapters amount to something like cognitive engineering, because 
they allow us to think a little farther beyond ourselves. And, we inherit these 
thought experiments from a premodern world that extends all the way to the 
bear nests in prehistoric caves. Moving closer to the present, these thought 
experiments extend to vegan Aristoxenus and succulent vegetarian Pythago-
ras; moving closer still, to the medieval Marie de France, whose protagonists 
fall for avian boyfriends; to the three drops of goose blood that make Chre-
tien’s Perceval think about Blancheflor; to the greyhound who feeds a knight; 
and all the way to the scientific revolution of the 1650s when Bergerac’s super- 
vegan Demon converses with cabbage. Was there resistance to these thought 
experiments? Yes, as La Fontaine’s alteration of the myth of Cupid and Psyche 
shows. Did the post/human imagination always exist in explicit, self- aware 
and mainstream ways? To  that question, we  offer a resounding “yes”—not 
least because much of post/human thought seems to correlate with an ethical 
imperative to not diminish and avariciously contract the world, but rather to 
expand the scope of human sympathy and ethical being.
